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RESTITUTIONARY DISGORGEMENT FOR
OPPORTUNISTIC BREACH OF CONTRACT
AND MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
Caprice L. Roberts*
Is a restitutionary disgorgement remedy for certain breaches of
contract compatible with the traditional contract principle of mitigation
requiring nonbreaching parties to take reasonable steps to minimize
damages? The relationship between disgorgement and mitigation is
complex, in part because disgorgement seems to undermine classic
contract notions such as Justice Holmes 's choice theory. Nevertheless,
disgorgement actually allows for certain value choices. Section 39 of
the forthcoming Restatement (Third) of Restitution seeks to deter
conscious wrongdoers from retaining profits from breach of contract.
This article addresses one objection to disgorgement: that
disgorgement will subvert a plaintiff's duty to mitigate a defendant's
damages after a breach of contract. This objection depends on many
unstable assumptions about both mitigation and disgorgement. This
Article attempts to tease out those assumptions and explain why and
how disgorgement ultimately could foster an environment in which
actors operate conscientiously to mitigate avoidable consequences.
Beneath the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels
the conscious wrongdoer to "disgorge" his gains.'
[A disgorgement based remedy, here for breach of
contract,] merely deprives the defendant of a profit
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exploring restitutionary disgorgement at the Remedies Forum (Emory Law School), the
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Unjust Enrichment in North America" (Washington & Lee University School of Law). The
author owes a debt of gratitude for continuing dialogues with Professors Andrew Kull, Doug
Rendleman, and Eoin O'Dell. The author also thanks Andrew Wright for thoughtful comments,
Allen Mendenhall for helpful research assistance, and Matthew L. Clark and Bertha Romine for
valuable revisions.
1. Warren v. Century Bankcorp., Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987).
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wrongfully made, a profit which the plaintiff was entitled to
make.2
It is true that a nonbreaching party to a contract has a duty
to take reasonable steps to mitigate its damages, and that its
failure to do so may prevent it from recovering damages
that otherwise could have been avoided?
I. INTRODUCTION
A bold disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breach of
contract is pending in one of the American Law Institute's ("ALI")
current undertakings, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment ("Restatement")." Section 39 of the draft
Restatement proposes disgorgement for "Profit Derived from
Opportunistic Breach."5 In cases where "breach of contract is both
material and opportunistic," this remedy, rooted in restitution, would
enable the injured party to disgorge "the profit realized by the
defaulting promisor as a result of the breach."6 This section explains
the theory as follows: "Liability in restitution with disgorgement of
profit is an alternative to liability for contract damages measured by
injury to the promisee."7 Under the umbrella of restitution and unjust
enrichment, this new black-letter law authorizes a disgorgement
remedy for certain breaches of contract. It is potentially
groundbreaking because traditional American contract law does not
have a rule encapsulating cases where disgorgement is the proper
remedy for breach.8 Further, the theoretical underpinnings of unjust
enrichment and disgorgement diverge from governing principles of
American contract law. This Article will explore this anticipated
2. Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977) (validating a
contract remedy measured by the fair market value of the defendant's gain rather than the
plaintiff's diminution of value).
3. Yang Ming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Okamoto Freighters Ltd., 259 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2001) (citing Buras v. Shell Oil Co., 666 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D. Miss. 1987)).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005).
5. Id. § 39.
6. Id. § 39(1).
7. Id.
8. See id. cmt. d at 11; see also id. at xv (acknowledging that contract orthodoxy does not
have such a rule and that section 39 is "essentially new").
RESTITUTIONAR Y DISGORGEMENT
tension by focusing on disgorgement's interface with contract law's
doctrine of mitigation.9
Is a restitutionary disgorgement remedy for certain breaches of
contract compatible with the traditional mitigation principle that asks
the nonbreaching party to take reasonable steps to minimize contract
damages? This Article will examine this thorny issue and conclude
that disgorgement conflicts with the underlying rationales for
mitigation and contract law generally. Ultimately, however, the
value choices of disgorgement, along with the intended rareness of
its applicability to contract breaches, may warrant the shift in
contract law and many of its historic doctrines, such as mitigation.
Before engaging the substance, an explanation of this "bedeviling"
and entrenched terminology is necessary. ° Accordingly, Part II of
this Article provides a general framework for understanding
restitution, disgorgement, and mitigation. Part III of this Article
explains the Restatement's narrow construction of disgorgement for
breach of contract, despite some international precedent for a broader
formulation and application. In Part IV, this Article discusses the
meaning of and justifications for the mitigation doctrine against the
backdrop of goals for traditional contract remedies and limitation
principles. Part V analyzes the interplay between restitutionary
disgorgement and contract law's mitigation doctrine. It offers two
analytical frameworks: (i) the theoretical plane and (ii) the practical
plane. For example, if the theoretical catalyst for this disgorgement
remedy is deterrence (and perhaps punishment) of opportunistic
breachers, placing mitigation requirements on the aggrieved party
may make little sense.
9. "The duty to mitigate is a universally accepted principle of contract law requiring that
each party exert reasonable efforts to minimize losses whenever intervening events impede
contractual objectives." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 967 (1983). Professors Goetz
and Scott acknowledge that the term "duty" is misleading, but utilize it because it is "common
and convenient." Id. at 967 n. 1. Properly construed, "the failure to mitigate merely 'disables' the
injured party from recovering avoidable losses." Id. (citing Rock v. Vandine, 189 P. 157, 157-58
(Kan. 1920); JUDSON A. CRANE, CASES ON DAMAGES 102 n.1 (1928); CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 128 (1935); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1184 (1970)).
10. Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1191, 1191-92 (1995) ("The
linguistic confusion that bedevils the law of restitution-necessitating laborious definitions before
anyone can understand what you are talking about-affords an early indication that the common
name of this neglected body of law was singularly ill-chosen.").
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Although tensions exist between the foundations of
restitutionary disgorgement and mitigation, this Article concludes in
Part VI that a practical avenue may exist in which efforts to mitigate
can serve as a prerequisite for restitutionary disgorgement for breach
of contract. The value of this path depends on our commitment to
providing only narrow access to disgorgement for breach of contract
coupled with our continued interest in encouraging self-help and
avoiding unnecessary consequences.
II. FRAMING RESTITUTION, DISGORGEMENT,
AND MITIGATION
Every substantive term in the title of this Article presents an
academic landmine. The following formulations seek to clarify this
Article's ultimate inquiry into the potential tension between
restitutionary disgorgement-a provocative remedy for a novel,
opportunistic breach of contract claim-and the mitigation doctrine
in contract law.
Disgorgement is an ancient remedy that strips the defendant's
gain. 1 A novel extension of that remedy is underway as part of a
black-letter law project in the area of law known as "restitution and
unjust enrichment." This disgorgement remedy will alter the
doctrinal landscape of contract law. This conclusion is true in part
because the disgorgement remedy's foundational guides conflict with
traditional contract law principles. I explore the broad ramifications,
as well as the potential benefits, of American contract law making
the leap in other articles. 2 This Article illustrates one dimension of
the anticipated friction between disgorgement's unjust enrichment
roots and contract law orthodoxy, including contract notions
stemming from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's choice principles. 3
More specifically, this Article will evaluate the interplay between a
11. See Warren v. Century Bankcorp., Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987) ("The remedy in
restitution rests on the ancient principles of disgorgement.").
12. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for
Breach of Contract, 77 U. CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract-1232258 [hereinafter Roberts, Restitutionary
Disgorgement]; see also Caprice L. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary
Disgorgementfor Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945 (2008) [hereinafter Roberts,
Commonwealth Disgorgement].
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897),
reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 702-03 (1998).
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restitutionary disgorgement remedy and the plaintiffs "duty" to
mitigate, or lessen, the defendant's damages in a breach of contract
case.
Restitutionary disgorgement lacks common meaning. In fact,
any definition invites controversy among doctrinal purists. To be
clear, however, I intend the word "restitution" to mean that unjust
enrichment must exist to trigger the remedy. I use "restitutionary" as
an adjective that modifies disgorgement. The key word for my
purpose is "disgorgement" because it is the remedy. Access to the
type of disgorgement at issue must be grounded in unjust enrichment
as developed under the law of restitution. American law,
unfortunately, has (mis)characterized restitution at times to have only
a limited meaning,14 such as a deposit paid before a defendant's
breach of the contract. Pursuant to this limited meaning, a plaintiff
receives a restitution remedy in the form of the deposit returned or
restored to the plaintiff. Among international scholars and courts,
the law of restitution tends to be conceptually much richer and
broader. 5 The broader unjust enrichment conception of restitution is
intended in this Article. I prefer to think of the arena as the law of
unjust enrichment, but not all scholars and other legal constituents
agree on a common lexicon, so American law will retain both and
thus speak in the language of the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment.
Use of the term restitutionary in this Article means that it would
be unjust for a defendant to retain a benefit without paying the
plaintiff for it. This formulation may be familiar from cases in which
a plaintiff delivers services without a valid enforceable contract but
the court deems that the defendant should not be permitted to retain
14. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES CASES & MATERIALS 403-04 (7th ed. 2006)
(explaining the myths to which many lawyers, judges, and professors cling when conducting
restitution analysis). In England, Peter Birks spearheaded a formidable movement to establish a
scheme for the law of restitution because the relaxation of forms of action in the nineteenth
century caused restitution to "disappear from the common law map." PETER BIRKS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION vii (1985). He lamented and pronounced the "gap"
of law "to be self-perpetuating since teachers and books are not called forth where there is no
learning; but [noted that] the supply of cases never dries up, because the lives of litigants are not
controlled by law school categories (though even litigants suffer when their lawyers have a blind-
spot.)" Id.
15. See generally Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 993 (2008) (exploring the rigorous, jurisprudential treatment of restitution
claims in other countries, such as England, versus American courts that create "very little"
substantive restitution law).
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the benefits of such services without compensating the plaintiff.6
Thus, the defendant will pay quantum meruit-as much as the
plaintiff deserves-the reasonable value of the services provided. 7
Here, however, we are not dealing with the valuation of a plaintiffs
services delivered to a defendant. Instead, the defendant may be
sitting with a benefit wrongfully obtained, 8 a benefit rightfully
belonging to the plaintiff; therefore, the profits derived from this
wrong should be disgorged from the defendant and provided to the
plaintiff. 9 Professor Kull offers a helpful hypothetical: "[I]f we
discover that an embezzler has invested $1,000 of the plaintiffs
money to yield $5,000, the plaintiff has a claim in restitution to
$5,000-not to $1,000 or even $1,000 plus market interest. 20
When would the benefit rightfully belong to the plaintiff? What
does unjust mean in the law of restitution and unjust enrichment?
The term unjust connotes unfairness. Unjust enrichment occurs, for
example, when a defendant retains a benefit for which she should
pay but has not paid. Specific examples abound and, to the shock of
many law students and practitioners, many cases arise under
freestanding restitution or unjust enrichment claims, i.e., the plaintiff
does not need an underlying contract, tort, or property claim. A
16. 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 4.2 (1978) ("Sometimes restitution
will be in specie and sometimes in the amount of money payments made by the plaintiff, but in a
high percentage of the cases it will be for the money value of his performance."); id. (exploring
the thorniness of the concept "benefit" as "it tends to suggest that there must have been some
addition to the defendant's wealth"). For example, in Planche v. Colburn, 131 Eng. Rep. 305
(A.C. 1831), the court ruled the plaintiff could recover the value of his work in quasi contract
where the defendant requested that the plaintiff write a book for publication. The plaintiff
worked on the manuscript until the defendant abandoned the project, and the defendant never
received a manuscript. Id. See also, PALMER, supra note 16, § 4.2, at 371 & nn.5-7 (discussing
other examples where plaintiffs recover the reasonable value of their performance).
17. See, e.g., Moses v. Stevens, 19 Mass. 332 (2 Pick. 1824) (authorizing recovery in
quantum meruit for the services performed by a minor who left employ before the promised
term's expiration). For a provocative discussion of the complexity of quantum meruit standards
and suggestions for reform, see generally Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum
Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 547 (1986).
18. FRANCESCO GIGLIO, THE FOUNDATIONS OF RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS 205 (2007)
("Unlike [pure restitution], here 'the measure of the gain ignores whether or not any transfer has
occurred and is measured by the actual profit accruing to the defendant from the wrong."')
(citation omitted).
19. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277,
1281 (1989) ("Avoidance of unjust enrichment explains why we award these profits to plaintiff.
But we are not restoring anything that plaintiff once had or ever would have.").
20. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest, "' and the Restatement
of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2022-23 (2001).
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quintessential freestanding example is mistaken transfer. For
example, "a misaimed First Bank computer fires money into Sarah's
checking account, no gift to Sarah was intended, no contract between
the two was breached, no conversion or other tort occurred, and no
property right was infringed. But the money unjustly enriches Sarah,
and surprise!, surprise!, she cannot keep it."'"
For all restitution claims, the unjust element derives, often, from
a sense of justice and fairness. But the claim of unjust enrichment
may be legal or equitable, depending on the remedy sought. Legal
restitution would include claims, often labeled quasi-contract, where
a defendant pays quantum meruit for a plaintiff's services wrongfully
retained.22 Equitable restitution would also rely on the presence of
unjust enrichment, but the remedy would require a constructive trust
or other equitable remedy.23
This Article addresses the restitutionary disgorgement remedy
that may lie in limited circumstances under contract law. Scholarly
support exists for such a remedy, although debate ensues over proper
line-drawing for applying the remedy.24 In a pending black-letter law
21. RENDLEMAN, supra note 14, at 383. Even in cases labeled "quasi-contract," if the
restitution recovery finds independent basis in the defendant's unjust enrichment, the claim may
be "freestanding" restitution. Id. at 402 (citing Kistler v. Stoddard, 688 S.W.2d 746 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1985); Kossian v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1967)).
22. See, e.g., Campbell v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1969) (affirming a jury
verdict on a "contract implied in law" for which the jury valuated quantum meruit based on the
fair market value rather than the defendant's realized benefit); RENDLEMAN, supra note 14, at
401 (characterizing quasi contract as legal restitution with such common counts as "quantum
meruit" in which a "plaintiff has performed services which will enrich the defendant unjustly
unless the defendant pays him"). Yet, the "equity fallacy" remains prevalent in court discussions.
See, e.g., Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990)
(providing the following detailed factors for the "equitable remedy" of quantum meruit: "To
recover under quantum meruit a claimant must prove that: '1) valuable services were rendered or
materials furnished; 2) for the person sought to be charged; 3) which services and materials were
accepted by the person sought to be charged, used and enjoyed by him; 4) under such
circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in
performing such services was expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged.')
(quoting Bashara v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985)).
23. See, e.g., Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1978) (utilizing "relaxed tracing"
to impose a constructive trust on part of a "substituted trust res"--life insurance proceeds of
decedent's beneficiary, his second wife-where decedent had promised to maintain at least
$7,000 of life insurance coverage for his first wife).
24. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 260-82 (2004);
ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, LAW OF RESTITUTION 515-26 (6th ed. 2002); PETER D.
MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 753-74 (2d ed. 2004); PALMER,
supra note 16, § 4.9; Peter Birks, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the
Fusion of Law and Equity, LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 421 (1987); John P. Dawson, Restitution
or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 186-89 (1959); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My
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project, restitutionary disgorgement is the proposed remedy for the
"opportunistic breach of contract. ' 25  Contract law's legal lexicon
does not possess a uniform definition of the phrase "opportunistic
breach." 6 It may mean selfish, advantageous, or exploitive behavior
resulting in a breach of contract. The Restatement comments for
section 39 emphasize "conscious advantage-taking" and "tak[ing]
without asking. 27
By discouraging conscious advantage-taking, does section 39
prohibit efficient breach of contracts? Scholarly debate exists
regarding distinctions between opportunistic breach and efficient
breach.2 ' Advocates of efficient breach encourage breaching a
contract if the anticipated gain would exceed paying the other party's
damages and thus leave some parties in a better position and no one
in a worse position.29 Some of the spirit of section 39 contrasts the
theory of efficient breach.3' But section 39 does not view efficient
breach as synonymous with opportunistic breach; rather, it "does not
automatically punish an efficient breach with a disgorgement
remedy, however, because of the requirement that the breach be
opportunistic. ' 31 Thus, section 39 narrows opportunism by requiring
Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339
(1985).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005).
26. Although "opportunistic breach" does not yet possess a well-known uniform definition,
scholars offer helpful guides. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES
392 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that "Judge Posner now recognizes a category of 'opportunistic' breach
of contract that ought to be deterred") (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 4.8, at 130) ("If a promisor breaks his promise merely to take advantage of the
vulnerability of the promisee in a setting (the normal contract setting) where performance is
sequential rather than simultaneous, we might as well throw the book at the promisor."); William
S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 652 (1999) (defining
opportunistic breach as occurring "if the breaching party attempts to get more than he bargained
for at the expense of the nonbreaching party").
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, cmt. b, at 7-8.
28. LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 392 (exploring the tension between opportunistic and
efficient breach).
29. See, e.g., ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 199-202 (2004); see also POSNER, supra note 26,
§ 1.2, at 13 (describing "Pareto-superior transaction" as "one that makes at least one person better
off and no one worse off').
30. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12 (exploring whether section 39
presents a threat to the efficient breach doctrine).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005).
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the breach to be "deliberate" and "profitable," and the injured party
must establish that a damage remedy would be "inadequate."32
Notably, Judge Posner envisions a type of breach where the promisor
breaches for no other reason except "to make money" and that "[w]e
can deter this kind of behavior by making it worthless to the
promisor, which we do by making him hand over all his profits from
the breach to the promisee; no lighter sanction would deter."33
The new disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breach of
contract is a component of what will be the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.34 The Restatement (Second)
never came to fruition, but rather the ALI abandoned the effort.
Thus, the new project nobly seeks to bring modem relevance to a
complex, riveting, and far-reaching body of restitution and unjust
enrichment law. Pursuant to years of rigorous revisions under the
direction of the reporter, Andrew Kull, and the Restitution Working
Group, the anticipated Restatement will replace the original 1937
Restatement of Restitution.35
The lines between this doctrinal area of law-restitution and
unjust enrichment-and contract law are not separate and distinct.
The Restatement will, by nature, overlap with numerous doctrinal
subjects. Further, it is unclear when the next Restatement of
Contracts might occur. 36 Accordingly, the ALI has determined that
32. Id. § 39(2). This section defines "opportunistic breach" as follows:
A breach is "opportunistic" if
(a) the breach is deliberate;
(b) the breach is profitable by the test of subsection (3); and
(c) the promisee's right to recover damages for the breach affords inadequate
protection to the promisee's contractual entitlement. In determining the adequacy of damages for
this purpose,
(i) damages are ordinarily an adequate remedy if they can be used to acquire
a full equivalent to the promised performance in a substitute transaction; and
(ii) damages are ordinarily an inadequate remedy if they cannot be used to
acquire a full equivalent to the promised performance in a substitute
transaction.
Id.
33. POSNER, supra note 26, § 4.8, at 131.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005).
35. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937).
36. The ALl published the most recent black-letter treatment of contracts, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981), in 1982.
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including the disgorgement remedy in the Restatement of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment, rather than holding it in abeyance for a
future Restatement of Contracts, is wise.
Professor Kull acknowledges that the Restatement's proposed
disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breach of contract is an
"essentially new" rule, although not without precedent.37  He
reassures that limiting language will narrow the application of the
remedy.38  Yet, the underlying premise is virtually limitless.
Accordingly, as explored in a related article, the implications of the
rule may well be broad in the area of contract law and beyond.39
As noted, this Article will keep its focus on a core concept in
contract damages, mitigation, or avoidability. Whatever label one
chooses, the following principle reveals the intention of the
substantive doctrine of limitation: "A court ordinarily will not
compensate an injured party for loss that that party could have
avoided by making efforts appropriate, in the eyes of the court, to the
circumstances. 4 °
The notion of mitigation, or the duty to mitigate damages, is
another landmine conceptually. Professor Doug Rendleman laudably
attempts to minimize the effects of blurring terminology. He
clarifies some definitional problems but acknowledges that
imprecision will remain:
The expression "mitigation of damages" technically
describes the ways a defendant may decrease a plaintiffs
damages. The same expression is frequently used to
describe what more correctly is termed "avoidable
consequences," the steps plaintiff should take to prevent her
damages from mounting. "Minimize damages" or
"avoidable consequences," is preferred, but "mitigation of
damages," though a little imprecise, is too entrenched in the
legal vocabulary to budge. 1
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, Reporter's
Introductory Memorandum, at xv (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
38. Id. § 39 cmt. a, at 6 ("The restitution claim here described is infrequently available,
because a breach of contract that satisfies the cumulative tests of § 39 is distinctly rare.").
39. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12.
40. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 12.12, at 806 (3d ed. 1999).
41. RENDLEMAN, supra note 14, at 101; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at 967 n. 1.
RESTITUTIONAR Y DISGOR GEMENT
Such technical distinctions are important, but in the end, the author
faces the familiar dilemma-to correct the imprecision or risk
multiplying the problem by speaking in the language most, including
non-academics, will understand.42 For now, this author opts for the
latter-adopting the one word, "mitigation," to capture any interest
that may exist in the plaintiff minimizing or avoiding damages. This
Article will explore the various substantive conceptions in Part
IV.B.43
Without a doubt, discord exists between the restitutionary
disgorgement remedy and the doctrine of mitigation. International
scholars have recognized the potential consequences of disgorgement
relief: "The general availability of gain-based relief also would affect
contract law in other ways. It would, for instance, tend to undermine
the duty to mitigate and subvert the rules governing 'cost to cure'
claims."'  Before fully exploring the effects of restitutionary
disgorgement on contract's doctrine of mitigation, however, an
examination of the Restatement's conceptualization of restitutionary
disgorgement is necessary.
III. RESTITUTIONARY DISGORGEMENT
A. Disgorgement Generally
Commonwealth countries permit, and international scholars call
for, broader reach of disgorgement principles in contract law.45
Although not unprecedented in American law, this remedy will be
essentially new to the American scene. The ALI has likely
determined that it is wise to proceed with a limited version of
disgorgement. As discussed in other articles,46 I believe that the
underlying concepts and the end result will resonate with students,
42. Put plainly: "Speak to me in a language I can hear." SMASHING PUMPKINS, Thirty-
Three, on MELLON COLLIE & THE INFINITE SADNESS (Virgin Records 1995).
43. See infra Part IV.B (examining the meaning and justifications for mitigating contract
damages).
44. Mitchell Mclnnes, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: The Search for a Principled
Relationship, in UNJUST ENRICHMENT & THE LAW OF CONTRACT 236 n.39 (E.J.H. Schrage ed.,
2001) (citing S. M. Waddams, Profits Derived from Breach of Contract: Damages or Restitution,
II J. CONTRACT L. 115, 118-20 (1997)).
45. Roberts, Commonwealth Disgorgement, supra note 12 (exploring broader international
support for disgorgement for breach of contract).
46. See Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12; Roberts, Commonwealth
Disgorgement, supra note 12.
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practitioners, and many scholars. Accordingly, the black-letter text
is narrow, while the spirit is broad. Therefore, the future may, and
perhaps should, hold a broader remedy.
For now, the restitutionary disgorgement remedy in American
law will be limited by the proposed language in the Restatement. To
be sure, neither the Restatement nor American case law supports
restitutionary disgorgement as a readily available, alternative remedy
for contractual breach.47 Rather, the Restatement is narrowly worded
and intended to create a limited avenue to thwart conscious
wrongdoers from profiting through breach where legal damages
would be inadequate.
B. Section 39's Narrow Conception
Section 39 utilizes words of limitation, but the spirit surrounding
the section is broad. Thus, despite the rule's narrow construction, the
implications may be sweeping. With those words of caution, the
entirety of the section provides:
§ 39. Profit Derived from Opportunistic Breach
(1) If a breach of contract is both material and
opportunistic, the injured promisee has a claim in restitution
to the profit realized by the defaulting promisor as a result
of the breach. Liability in restitution with disgorgement of
profit is an alternative to liability for contract damages
measured by injury to the promisee.
(2) A breach is "opportunistic" if
(a) the breach is deliberate;
(b) the breach is profitable by the test of
subsection (3); and
(c) the promisee's right to recover damages for
the breach affords inadequate protection to the
promisee's contractual entitlement. In determining
the adequacy of damages for this purpose,
(i) damages are ordinarily an adequate
remedy if they can be used to acquire a full
equivalent to the promised performance in a
substitute transaction; and
47. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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(ii) damages are ordinarily an inadequate
remedy if they cannot be used to acquire a full
equivalent to the promised performance in a
substitute transaction.
(3) A breach is "profitable" when it results in gains to the
defaulting promisor (net of potential liability in damages)
greater than the promisor would have realized from
performance of the contract. Profits from breach include
saved expenditure and consequential gains that the
defaulting promisor would not have realized but for the
breach. The amount of such profits must be proved with
reasonable certainty.
(4) Disgorgement by the rule of this Section will be denied
(a) if the parties' agreement authorizes the
promisor to choose between performance of the
contract and a remedial alternative such as payment of
liquidated damages; or
(b) to the extent that disgorgement would result
in an inappropriate windfall to the promisee, or would
otherwise be inequitable in a particular case.48
"Traditional contract law," as Professor Kull acknowledges,
"contains no rule identifying the cases in which disgorgement is an
appropriate remedy for breach. '49 This new rule, section 39 in the
Restatement of Restitution," crystallizes the law for a bold remedy
available for certain breaches of contract. A gain-based remedy for a
breach of contract case is not unprecedented, however. American
law simply lacks an overarching theory to explain the phenomenon.
The Restatement proposes section 39 to fill this void. Section 39,
years in the making, offers:
a general theory of disgorgement in contract cases (namely,
that it is a remedy for opportunistic breach); a definition of
opportunism in this context (deliberate and profitable
breach where the promisee's entitlement is inadequately
protected by a damage remedy); and a practical test for the
48. Id.
49. Id. cmt. d, at 11.
50. Id. § 39.
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one element of that definition (inadequacy of damages) that
has traditionally been the most problematic."
In the careful drafting of section 39, the Restatement attempts to
ensure narrow application of this restitutionary disgorgement
remedy. In fact, it intends to authorize disgorgement only for
"exceptional cases" in which "a party's profitable breach of contract
may be a source of unjust enrichment at the expense of the other
contracting party."52  Professor Kull asserts that the proposed
disgorgement remedy is "infrequently available, because a breach of
contract that satisfies the cumulative tests of § 39 is distinctly rare. 5 3
He maintains that the "innovation" of the section stems not from the
ability to disgorge a defendant's wrongfully obtained profits from
breach "but in stating a rule to generalize these commonly accepted
outcomes."54
The spirit of section 39, if not the letter, occasions interesting
ripples in the sea of contract law. Notably, this restitutionary
disgorgement remedy enters against the backdrop of contract law's
Holmesian underpinning-the choice principle.5 As Professor Kull
acknowledges, "[t]here is substantial truth, though not of course the
whole story, in the Holmesian paradox according to which the
obligation imposed by contract lies in a choice between performance
and payment of damages."56
Such a formulation is most apt "in those transactional contexts
where damages can be calculated with relative confidence as a full
equivalent of performance."57  Accordingly, Professor Kull offers
disgorgement as a remedy parallel to other traditional equitable
remedies that "supplement the protection afforded by a liability in
damages, precisely at those points where the difficulty of proving
damages poses a systematic risk of inadequate protection" of the
plaintiffs interests. 8 Disgorgement is analogous to the equitable
remedies of specific performance and injunctive relief, which are
51. Id. cmt. d, at 11.
52. Id. cmt. a, at 4.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id.
55. Holmes, supra note 13.
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at 5-6.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id.
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available to protect particular contract "entitlements."59 According to
Professor Kull, "[t]he law of restitution affords a comparable
protection after the fact, awarding gains from a profitable breach of a
contract that the defendant can no longer be required to perform."'6
In addition to paralleling equitable remedies, another feature that
aims to cabin this restitutionary disgorgement is that the breach must
be opportunistic. The provocative nature of the term, coupled with
the power and bounty of disgorgement, may provide significant
temptation to overutilize section 39. But the Restatement seeks to
subside fears of abuse with language of limitation regarding section
39's application. In addition to the inadequacy of damages
requirement, section 39 defines "opportunistic" to identify only
breaches that are "deliberate" and "profitable."'" Section 39 defines
"profitable" as "when [the breach] results in gains to the defaulting
promisor (net of potential liability in damages) greater than the
promisor would have realized from performance of the contract."62
But, will we know it when we see this type of case?
According to Professor Kull, "[c]ases in which restitution
reaches the profits from a breach of contract are those in which the
promisee's contractual position is vulnerable to abuse."63  One is
"vulnerable" if she faces challenges "in recovering, as damages, a
full equivalent of the performance for which the promisee has
bargained."' As an example of such a situation, Professor Kull
offers: "A promisor who was permitted to exploit the shortcomings
of the promisee's damage remedy could accept the price of the
promised performance, then deliver something less than what was
promised."65 In Professor Kull's estimation, this example "results in
unjust enrichment as between the parties."66
Disgorgement will combat opportunistic breach, for example,
when specific performance is routinely available, such as "a
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 39(2).
62. Id. § 39(3).
63. Id. cmt. b, at 7.
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
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promised conveyance of real property (or any other unique good)."67
The following illustrations represent the sorts of opportunism the law
of restitution condemns.68 The first involves a promise to sell
property; the second a violation of a covenant not to compete.
1. Vendor and Purchaser agree on a sale of Blackacre for
$100,000. Two weeks before the scheduled closing date,
Vendor conveys Blackacre to a second purchaser for
$110,000. Purchaser is entitled to recover $10,000 from
Vendor by the rule of this Section. Purchaser need not
prove the value of Blackacre on the scheduled closing date;
nor could Vendor reduce or avoid his liability under this
Section by proving that the market value of Blackacre on
that date was something less than $110,000.69
2. Buyer pays Seller $500,000 cash in exchange for
(i) Seller's existing business as a going concern and
67. Id. cmt. e, at 12.
68. All of the illustrations are exact copies from the Restatement's proposed illustrations for
section 39. The Restatement also provides examples where disgorgement will not lie, such as the
case of nonconforming tender:
Seller agrees to manufacture and deliver to Buyer 1000 widgets at $1000 each.
Seller's normal cost of production is $250 per widget. Before the date fixed for
delivery, problems with Seller's manufacturing equipment increase Seller's cost of
production to $350 per widget. Seeking to minimize its own cost of performance,
Seller acquires similar widgets from Supplier at $300 each and tenders them to Buyer.
Although Seller's conduct is evidently self-interested, it is consistent, under the
circumstances, with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade
(U.C.C. § 2-103(b)). Buyer accepts the goods but notifies Seller that they are
nonconforming and sues for breach of warranty. Buyer proves at trial that the goods
did not conform to the contract and that each of Supplier's widgets was worth $10 less
than a comparable widget manufactured by Seller. Seller's breach of contract is
deliberate and profitable (saving $50,000 by comparison with the cost to Seller of
making a conforming tender), but it is not opportunistic: on the facts assumed, there is
no reason to conclude that Buyer's entitlement will be inadequately protected by an
ordinary damage remedy. Buyer is entitled to damages of $10,000 (U.C.C. § 2-
714(2)), but Buyer is not entitled to Seller's saved expenditure of $50,000.
Id. illus. 13, at 23-24; see also Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12, at 36-37
(noting that illustration 13 raises provocative questions about efficient versus opportunistic
breach).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT illus. 1, at 13
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). Illustration 2 involves a contract that expressly provided that
timber and gravel would convey with the property, but prior to conveyance the vendor removes
timber and gravel for a net gain of $10,000. Id. illus. 2, at 14. The purchaser does not possess a
property right yet, and the removal of the timber and gravel do not diminish the value of the
property. The Restatement maintains that purchaser should recover the $10,000 under the rule of
section 39. See Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1977); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, at 31 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005) (discussing Laurin in conjunction with illustration 2).
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(ii) Seller's promise not to compete with Buyer for a period
of three years. The restraints thus imposed on Seller are
reasonable, and the promise not to compete is enforceable
under local law. Acting in deliberate disregard of his
contractual obligations, Seller operates a new business in
competition with Buyer for the final year of the three-year
term, realizing profits of $50,000. Buyer is entitled to
recover $50,000 from Seller by the rule of this Section. It is
not a condition of restitution that Buyer prove damages as a
result of Seller's breach.7"
"By condemning [such forms] of opportunism, the rule of § 39
reinforces the contractual position of the vulnerable party and
condemns a form of conscious advantage-taking that is the
equivalent, in the contractual context, of an intentional and profitable
tort. 71  Professor Kull clarifies, "Restitution (through the
disgorgement remedy) seeks to defeat" an "opportunistic
calculation" where "the wrongdoer takes without asking."" The
availability of disgorgement will force the defendant's hand. At
minimum, disgorgement seeks to "reduc[e] the likelihood that the
conscious disregard of another's entitlement can be more
advantageous than its negotiated acquisition."" Thus, a party
considering breach will have an incentive to negotiate "modification
or release of his own contractual obligation."74
Section 39 also delimits access to the remedy by providing two
significant caveats. The Restatement declares that disgorgement will
be unavailable: (1) if the contract provides a choice between
performance and an alternative remedy such as liquidated damages
or (2) "to the extent that disgorgement would result in an
inappropriate windfall to the promisee, or would otherwise be
inequitable in a particular case."" The first exception is
uncontroversial as it simply provides that the parties are free to
contract around the disgorgement remedy just as they may with
expectation damages. The greater potential for controversy stems
70. Id. illus. 6, at 17.
71. Id. cmt. b, at 7 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 39(4), at 4.
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from the second inappropriate-windfall caveat. Section 39 will
prolong litigation because it provides defendants with a formidable
weapon of argumentation to ward off disgorgement, and it requires
interpretation. To the extent that the inappropriate-windfall caveat
simply signifies that the judge retains discretion to deny relief, it may
not need to be stated in these words. The judge already possesses
such discretion because the design of disgorgement is equitable and
thus parallel to specific performance and injunctive relief. Further, if
an inappropriate windfall exists, the judge could deny or limit
disgorgement on the more central ground that a defendant's retention
of the profit would not constitute an unjust enrichment warranting
this restitutionary relief.
Professor Kull maintains that the overall purpose of this
disgorgement remedy "is not merely to frustrate conscious
wrongdoers but to reinforce the stability of the contract itself,
enhancing the ability of the parties to negotiate for a contractual
performance that may not be easily valued in money."76 Given that
the underlying rationale of disgorgement contrasts in many respects
with the foundational principles of contract doctrine, the goal of
disgorgement reinforcing the contract may pose a tall order. The
possibility of strengthening the vulnerable party's post-contract
bargaining power may well be worth upsetting contract law's
doctrinal applecart.
In sum, section 39 is innovative and potentially powerful, albeit
limited by significant requirements. Plaintiffs' lawyers will certainly
be eager to test those boundaries. They will capitalize on the
foundation of unjust enrichment and language of disapprobation,
opportunistic and conscious wrongdoing. As the trial period of this
black-letter formulation unfolds, the interface with traditional
contract doctrines, such as mitigation, should be fascinating.
IV. CONTRACT MITIGATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
GOALS OF CONTRACT DAMAGES
A. Goals of Contract Damages
The primary goal of damages in contract law is compensation.
Unlike tort law, contract law does not also service the desire to
76. Id. at 8.
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punish-at least not officially. In fact, orthodox American contract
law does not permit punitive damages for breach of contract." In
order to recover punitive damages in connection with a breach of
contract, the damages must emanate from an independent tort. 8
Because the focus of contract law is not on penalizing a contract
breacher, contract damages look to the plaintiff rather than the
defendant. If following the preferred monetary remedy of
expectation damages," the key is the plaintiff-plaintiff's thwarted,
expected "benefit of the bargain."8 The alternative reliance measure
also keys to the plaintiffs loss in the form of out-of-pocket expenses
spent in reliance on the contract.8 1  Thus, the primary contract
77. "The firmly established [American] common law rule holds that punitive damages are
not to be awarded for simple breach of contract." DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION, § 12.5(2), at 117 (2d ed. 1993) (citing cases extensively and
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981)). In Canada, however, the winds of
change are present. A recent case permitted the recovery of punitive damages for breach of
contract. See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 2002 SCC 18 (Can.); see also Robert
J. Sharpe, Remedies for Bad Behaviour in Canadian Contract Law, in SECOND INTERNATIONAL
REMEDIES SYMPOSIUM, AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND (forthcoming 2008) (noting Canadian
"courts' increasing tendency to make contract damage awards to sanction bad behaviour rather
than compensate for the loss of the plaintiff's economic expectation interest").
78. See DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.5(2), at 118 (citing various cases in which the court
denied damages where an independent tort did not exist).
79. See Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365 (Exch.) (advancing the
expectancy rule that "where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far
as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract
had been performed"); see also L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (setting forth three categories of contract
damages listed in order of: (i) the restitution interest, (ii) the reliance interest, and (iii) the
expectation interest; and arguing that the restitution interest "presents the strongest case for
[judicial] relief' in order to maintain an Aristotelian equilibrium); see generally Maree Chetwin,
Fuller and Perdue's Limitations: Opportunities, Performance and the Contractual Remedies Act
1979, in SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES-ADVANCING THE
COMMON LAW OF REMEDIES: PRAXIS AND PEDAGOGY THROUGHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH
(forthcoming 2008) (providing a modem exploration of Fuller and Perdue's classifications from
the perspective of New Zealand law).
80. See, e.g., Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 108, 114 (2003) ("One
approach [to breach-of-contract damages] is to give the nonbreaching party the benefits he or she
expected to receive had the breach not occurred, also known as the 'benefit of the bargain"'); JR.
Loftus, Inc. v. White, 649 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (N.Y. 1995) (defining expectancy damages, the
traditional measure, as the "anticipated profit or full contract price less the cost of performance");
Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 672, 678 n.5 (Colo. 1994) (recognizing the "benefit of the
bargain rule" designed to give the plaintiff her expectation interest).
81. See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, § 64:2 at 30-32 (4th ed., West Group 1990) ("Reliance damages are designed to
compensate the plaintiff for any reasonably foreseeable costs incurred or expenditures made in
reliance on the promise that has now been broken. An award of reliance damages returns the
plaintiff to its precontractual position by putting a dollar value on the detriment the plaintiff
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monetary remedies-expectation damages and reliance damages-
aim to compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused by the
defendant's breach.
In contrast to this traditional contract landscape, disgorgement
focuses on the defendant. Disgorgement is a gain-based damage; it
keys to the gain, or benefit, the defendant wrongfully possesses.
Furthermore, it may infuse punishment, which I maintain in a related
article.83 Even if it is permissible to award disgorgement for a breach
of contract without punishing the defendant, the remedy shifts the
focus away from the plaintiffs loss to the defendant's enrichment.
But contract damage doctrines are not unfamiliar with looking to
a defendant's interests. The main mission of traditional contract law
damages is compensating a plaintiffs loss; yet, contract law does not
ignore the defendant's concerns, including fairness to the defendant
even though the defendant is the breaching party. Contract law
offers a gentler landing to the breaching defendant by asking the
plaintiff to curtail the flow of her damages, if possible, and, in some
cases, to act affirmatively to aid the defendant in lessening damages.
Accordingly, the contractual doctrine of mitigation, like
disgorgement, keys to the defendant.
Are these two apparent defendant-centric notions parallel and
compatible? At least one critical, foundational distinction exists:
restitutionary disgorgement is itself a remedy, while the doctrine of
mitigation is a limitation on contract damages. The full interplay
between the contractual doctrine of mitigation and restitutionary
disgorgement will depend in part upon the contours and roots of the
mitigation doctrine.
incurred in reliance on the now-broken promise and reimbursing expenditures the plaintiff made
in performing or preparing to perform its part of the contract.").
82. See id. Rescinding the contract and restoring monies paid by the plaintiff may key to the
plaintiff. These actions ask: What traveled to the defendant from the plaintiff? Or, do these
actions key to the defendant? What did the defendant gain wrongfully? See also Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 79, at 55 (maintaining that this restitution interest sought to recover values
provided to the defendant, i.e. the defendant's gain).
83. See Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12, at 33, 43.
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B. Mitigation, Avoiding Consequences,
Minimizing Damages
i. Mitigation in Context: Roots of Contract
Limitation Doctrines
The notion of a plaintiff mitigating the defendant's damage is
one example of limitations on plaintiff's recovery. A seminal
limitation on a plaintiffs recovery stems from Hadley v.
Baxendale.84 Hadley's "contemplation of [the] parties" doctrine85
provides a significant limitation on a plaintiffs consequential
damages.86 Under the Hadley limitation, a defendant will be liable
for consequential damages (e.g., plaintiffs loss of profits) only if
both parties contemplated such special damages at the time of
contracting.87  Given restitutionary disgorgement's focus on a
defendant's profits gained rather than a plaintiffs lost profits,88 the
Hadley doctrine raises complex questions for discussion in a future
article. Yet, Hadley's stronghold-as more than a century-old,
widely applied limitation on contractual damages-offers a useful
template for understanding the roots of contractual doctrines of
limitation more generally.
The foundational principles justifying limitation doctrines, such
as Hadley's contemplation of the parties rule, shed light on the
examination of the compatibility of restitutionary disgorgement and
mitigation. According to Professor Dan Dobbs's remedies treatise,
three broad rationales may support the Hadley limitation: (i) moral,
(ii) economic, and (iii) pragmatic.89 Elucidating these three
categories will inform the instant exploration of mitigation.
84. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.).
85. This doctrine is sometimes shorthanded as the "foreseeability test," where the defendant
is not liable for "unforeseeable" harms resulting from a breach of contract. DOBBS, supra note
77, § 12.4(6), at 93. Interestingly, the Hadley court never uttered this precise formulation. Id.
86. Plaintiffs general damages, i.e., those damages that are the "natural and ordinary
consequences" of breach and "based on the value of the very performance promised," "are always
recoverable." Id. § 12.4(5), at 85.
87. See id. § 12.4(6), at 93.
88. Arguably, a plaintiff may maintain that the defendant's wrongfully obtained profits
represent the plaintiff's hypothetical losses. This analogy requires some creative leveraging. The
losses are not actual losses where a plaintiff can show lost profits, such as the mill owner in
Hadley. Instead, the plaintiff may claim that the defendant's contractual breach caused a lost
opportunity that simultaneously enabled the defendant to gain profits.
89. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.4(5).
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The term "moral" in Dobbs's discussion appears to denote a
contrast with a natural law conception and perhaps even a positivist
one. In Dobbs's interpretation, "[d]amages are not, in other words,
measured by a rule of law imposed from above, but by the parties'
own agreement."9 If "from above" implies other worldly, a god, or
universal principles, then the term moral contrasts with a natural law
framework. A natural law conception might support a mitigation
limitation on damages that derives from, for example, the "Golden
Rule."'" Essentially, a plaintiff should keep damages down because
he should do unto others-here defendants-as the plaintiff would
want done to himself.9" Dobbs's moral basis does not include an
ought that comes "from above." Accordingly, such a conception of
moral basis appears not to trigger an inquiry into rightdoing versus
wrongdoing, at least not in the sense of judgment. Whatever
obligation arises, it is the product of the voluntary agreement of the
parties.
If "from above" means not from human-made, top-down laws,
but instead from bottom-up, voluntary creations of obligations
between parties, then Dobbs's moral basis may also contrast with a
positivist conception. Certainly, common law doctrines, as well as
statutes, will support any ultimate legal enforcement of damages as
envisioned by "the parties' own agreement."93 Yet, the from above
quotation emphasizes that contract law, unlike tort law, derives its
force and scope from voluntary acts of individual parties. The public
policy driving American tort law imposes responsibilities and
90. Id. at 85 (emphasis added). The "will theory" is also relevant. In examining
justifications for the "rule protecting the expectancy," Fuller and Perdue offer the much discussed
"will theory" of contract law. "This theory views the contracting parties as exercising, so to
speak, a legislative power, so that the legal enforcement of a contract becomes merely an
implementing by the state of a kind of private law already established by the parties. If A has
made, in proper form, a promise to pay B one thousand dollars, we compel A to pay this sum
simply because the rule or lex set up by the parties calls for this payment. Uti lingua nuncupassit,
itajus esto." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 79, at 58 (citing BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH
DES PANDEKTENRECHTS, § 68, n.la (9th ed. 1906) ("A legal transaction is the exercise of the
creative power which the private will possesses in legal matters. The individual commands, and
the law adopts his command as its own.")).
91. See generally JEFFREY WATTLES, THE GOLDEN RULE (Oxford University Press 1996)
(revealing the history behind the "Golden Rule" generally and citing to Confucian, Greek, Jewish,
and Christian texts specifically); Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment and
Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (defending the Golden Rule as a fairness
principle that requires doing good towards others).
92. See Matthew 7:12.
93. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.4(5), at 85.
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consequences on actors, whereas contract law's duties and
consequences stem from the voluntary agreements of the parties.
Therefore, Dobbs's treatment of the Hadley limitation provides:
"The moral basis for limiting contract liability lies in the idea that the
boundaries of contract liability are determined by the contract itself;
the scope of the risks assumed by the defendant delineate[s] the
scope of his liability."94 If the consequential damages are within the
contemplation of both parties at the time of contracting, then such
damages are recoverable under Hadley.95 But, if a defendant did not
"explicitly or impliedly" undertake a promise to protect against such
special harms, the Hadley principle denies recovery of such harms.96
Thus, the "contemplation of the parties" limitation, in this moral
conception, derives from the parties' understanding of the risks
undertaken as part of, and only as contemplated at the time of, their
agreement. In contrast, the mitigation doctrine may come from
above rather than comfortably within the confines of the agreement
the parties made. Further discussion of this contrast follows in
Part IV.B.ii.
Under an economic rationale, at least three theories exist:
(1) "increased costs;" (2) "cross-subsidiaries;" and (3) "efficient use
of resources." Dobbs initially frames each of these justifications in
the negative in order to avoid an anticipated economic harm. He
explains the economic basis for a limitation as stemming from a
concern that "unrestricted liability for all provable consequential
damages would tend to (a) raise the price of the goods or services the
defendant provides, (b) 'cross subsidize' some users of the good or
services at the expense of other users, and (c) sometimes produce an
'inefficient' use of resources."97  Such economic considerations
possess import for the mitigation doctrine, as explored in the next
subsection of this Article.
As a final rationale, Dobbs simply provides a justification that is
admittedly "skimpier and pragmatic rather than principled."9  He
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 88 (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (3d ed. 1986)
("setting appropriate incentives to deal with the potential loss")); Gwyn D. Quillen, Contract
Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (1988).
98. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.4(6), at 91.
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offers the "pragmatic limitation" as the notion "that liability must
stop somewhere and that courts must have a language for stating the
stopping place."99  Dobbs correctly observes that the pragmatic
rationale supports "any kind of limitation," not merely a Hadley
limitation.' A pragmatic limitation, as so defined, thus serves as a
possible basis for a mitigation principle. Is it the driving principle
behind the mitigation doctrine? If so, an examination of the various
conceptions of the mitigation doctrine, obligations it may impose,
and its roots is necessary.
ii. Conceptions of Mitigation and Avoidance
Treatments of mitigation run the gamut. The terminology
varies. Further, misconceptions exist about whether a contract
plaintiff possesses the oft-cited duty to mitigate. Dobbs's remedies
treatise frames the issue under the broad rubric of "avoidable
consequences" and "minimizing damages."'' He primarily utilizes
the doctrine of avoidable consequences because it applies to damages
generally as well as to contract damages in particular. As discussed
in the Introduction, 102 contract treatments often adopt the phrase
"duty to mitigate"'0 3  rather than the phrase "avoidable
consequences," which is more commonly seen in tort law.0 4 In any
event, the meaning desired here is that "the plaintiff must make
reasonable efforts to minimize consequential damages resulting from
the breach."'0 5  Although courts often shorthand the discussion to
emphasize a plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages, it is more precise to
understand the meaning to be "only that the plaintiffs recovery is
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 12.6(1)-(2), at 127.
102. See supra Part I.
103. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-
Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U.
COLO. L. REv. 553 (1976).
104. See Coker v. Abell-Howe Co., 491 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1992) (holding that a party
cannot recover damages flowing from consequences that the party could reasonably have
avoided); see also Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 748 A.2d 961, 969-70 (Me. 2000)
(distinguishing the doctrine of avoidable consequences from the doctrine of contributory
negligence).
105. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.6(2), at 128 (noting also that the defendant carries the
burden "to show what damages could have been avoided by different and reasonable conduct of
the plaintiff').
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reduced to the extent that he unreasonably fails to minimize his
damages."1 °6  Moreover, a "plaintiffs damages are not reduced for
failure to make an effort; they are reduced for failure to avoid
damages that a reasonable effort would have avoided."'' 7
Importantly, this view of mitigation includes both affirmative
and negative components. For example, if a plaintiff receives notice
of a defendant's anticipatory repudiation of the promised contractual
performance, the plaintiff must not act any further to create more
damage. Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co."18 represents the
classic example of this facet of mitigation.0 9 When the plaintiff
learned that the defendant, Rockingham County, did not plan to
perform as promised (payment),"' the plaintiff should have stopped
any further contractual performance in order to curtail additional
damages "piling up" (building the bridge)."' Accordingly, the
106. Id. at 131.
107. Id.
108. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
109. See id.; see also Barak Richman, Jordi Weinstock & Jason Mehta, A Bridge, a Tax
Revolt, and the Struggle to Industrialize: The Story and Legacy of Rockingham County v. Luten
Bridge Co., 84 N.C. L. REv. 1841, 1841-42 (2006) ("Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. is
now a staple in most contracts casebooks," but the "opinion was an effort to arm county
governments with the powers necessary to facilitate industrialization and secure good
governance. The duty to mitigate damages was merely an afterthought.") (emphasis omitted).
110. Professor Richman and commentators Weinstock and Mehta note:
The popular story goes as follows: Rockingham County entered into a contract with the
Luten Bridge Company to build a bridge over the Dan River. Shortly after work
commenced, the county repudiated the contract. Nonetheless, the Luten Bridge
Company continued with its construction project and sued the county for the entire bill.
Richman et al., supra note 109, at 1841. The authors "revisited" the opinion and offer that, under
two arguments, "[T]he board of county commissioners as constituted by Hampton, Barber, and
Martin could, in [Judge] Parker's view, speak for the county. As such, their declarations that the
county no longer wanted the bridge and their instructions to the Luten Bridge Company to halt
construction constituted official county actions." Id. at 1885. The Luten Bridge holding relies
upon the finding that an effective anticipatory repudiation occurred via those official county
actions.
111. Luten Bridge, 35 F.2d at 307 ("If A enters into a binding contract to build a house for B,
B, of course, has no right to rescind the contract without A's consent. But if, before the house is
built, he decides that he does not want it, and notifies A to that effect, A has no right to proceed
with the building and thus pile up damages."). Applying this principle, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that
[T]he county decided not to build the road of which the bridge was to be a part, and did
not build it. The bridge, built in the midst of the forest, is of no value to the county
because of this change of circumstances. When, therefore, the county gave notice to
the plaintiff that it would not proceed with the project, plaintiff should have desisted
from further work. It had no right thus to pile up damages by proceeding with the
erection of a useless bridge.
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defendant will not be held liable for the consequential damages that
the plaintiff could have reasonably avoided."
12
In contrast, the affirmative version of mitigation extends by
requiring the plaintiff to take steps to lessen the defendant's
damage." 3  The nonbreaching party should "take reasonable
affirmative steps to make appropriate substitute arrangements to
avoid loss.""114 The breaching party, however, carries "[t]he burden
of showing that the injured party could have, but has not, taken
appropriate steps" to avoid damages."5 If the breaching party meets
this burden, the court will reduce the injured party's damages by "the
amount of loss that could have been avoided.""' 6
With the sale of goods, the affirmative version has some
traction. For example, if certain carrier problems occur, the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") provides that "substitute performance
must be tendered and accepted" if "a commercially reasonable
substitute is available.""' The U.C.C. also states that the aggrieved
party may await performance for a commercially reasonable time
after learning of repudiation or may resort to any remedy for breach,
including one in which the plaintiff buyer may "cover" by securing a
market substitute."' For example, if a seller provides notice that it
Id.
112. See SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 64:27 (4th ed. 2002) ("Damages which the plaintiff might have avoided with
reasonable effort without undue risk, expense, burden, or humiliation will be considered either as
not having been caused by the defendant's wrong or as not being chargeable against the
defendant.").
113. FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, at 809.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 807.
116. Id. at 809.
117. U.C.C. § 2-614(1) (1998).
118. Id. §§ 2-711(1) (Buyer's Remedies), 2-712 (Buyer's "Cover"). Yet, the U.C.C. states
that "[f]ailure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from any other
remedy." Id. § 2-712(3). Under the alternative U.C.C. formula, however, damages are measured
by "the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and
the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages . . . ,but less expenses
saved in consequence of the seller's breach." Id. § 2-713(1). More notably, the buyer may
recover consequential damages only if: (i) the seller "at the time of contracting had reason to
know" of the "general or particular requirements and needs" from which the loss flows, and
(ii) the loss "could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." Id. § 2-7 15(2) (emphasis
added). If the buyer is the breaching party, comparable minimizing principles apply. See id. § 2-
706(1) (Seller's Remedies). Such minimizing doctrines are inapplicable if the seller is a "lost
volume seller" in that the seller has an unlimited supply and thus should not have her damages
reduced because she could have sold both the defendant's contracted goods and the substitute
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will fail to deliver the promised bushels of peaches, the plaintiff
buyer must cover by purchasing substitute peaches on the market or
forego any claim to consequential damages. 19 If the plaintiff could
have purchased but failed to purchase comparable peaches available
on the market at a cheaper price than the contract, the defendant will
be able to maintain that if the plaintiff had taken the proper steps to
mitigate, the plaintiff would have benefitted from the breach and
should recover no consequential damages.'20 Only if the peaches
promised were unique (i.e., no market substitute and thus no cover
option) may the plaintiff instead seek specific performance. 2' If the
deal. See id. § 2-708(2); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972). In other
words, the efforts to engage in a substitute transaction do not amount to avoiding or minimizing
damages because it is not the breach that created the opportunity for a substitute transaction;
rather, seller could have accomplished both sales, so damages would not be reduced by the other
sale. The lost volume concept extends to service contracts where the seller has the capacity to
expand and service both the breached contract and the ostensible replacement contract. See, e.g.,
Kearsarge Computer, Inc. v. Acme Staple Co., 366 A.2d 467, 471 (N.H. 1976) (awarding the
plaintiff full contract price on the "theor,. .. that the second sale would have occurred even if the
defendant did not breach his contract" because the plaintiff's business was expandable); M & R
Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 138 A.2d 350 (Md. 1958) (applying to a building
contractor). Conceptually, the lost volume principle "presumes that [the seller] can accept a
virtually unlimited amount of business so that income generated from accounts acquired after the
breach does not mitigate the plaintiffs damages." Kearsarge, 366 A.2d at 471 (citing 5 ARTHUR
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1041 (1964)). The lost volume seller doctrine is not without limits,
whether in the sales or services context. The Seventh Circuit, for example, refined the lost
volume doctrine by endorsing one commentator's position that under "the economic law of
diminishing returns or increasing marginal costs[,] ... as a seller's volume increases, . . . a point
will inevitably be reached where the cost of selling each additional item diminishes the
incremental return to the seller and eventually makes it entirely unprofitable to conclude the next
sale." R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Morris G. Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One Profit for the
Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 697, 705 (1973)). On remand, the plaintiff met the burden of
establishing that it would have been profitable to produce and sell both units. See R.E. Davis
Chem. Corp. 924 F.2d at 709.
119. U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
120. Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Johnson, 133 S.W. 784 (Ky. 1911). Some support may
exist for a plaintiff to seek recovery for hypothetical, reasonable incidental costs for what it would
have cost to accomplish the hypothetical cover deal. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.6(2), at 140-41.
Dobbs posits that the "rule pattern" should be completed. Id. at 140. He explains that there are
"two parallel 'actuality' rules"--"actual reduction of damages by successfully minimizing actions
and with actual expenses incurred to minimize damages." Id. Accordingly, he suggests that there
should also be "two parallel 'hypothetical' rules": the recognized "damages reduction" for what
"would have occurred if the plaintiff had behaved reasonably" and then the missing corollary-
plaintiff's offset to this damages reduction by a hypothetical reasonable expenditure of funds it
would have taken to have behaved reasonably. Id.
121. See U.C.C. § 2-716(1). Compare Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d
939 (Idaho 1978) (denying specific performance of a 1974 Chevrolet pickup truck), with Sedmak
v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (permitting specific
performance for a limited edition "Indy Pace car"). For a pre-Code case granting specific
performance for a good, see Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 66 A. 935 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (noting that
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plaintiff purchased the comparable peaches within a commercially
reasonable time in a rising market such that the cover price exceeded
contract price, then the defendant's damages will be the cover price
minus the contract price.12  Thus, each of these scenarios reflects the
incentives for self-help that the U.C.C. adopts in order to facilitate
minimizing damages and to keep the wheels of commerce flowing.'
The affirmative version also applies beyond the sale-of-goods
context. For example, the employment context incorporates
minimizing rules. Accordingly, "when the defendant repudiates a
contract obligation before time for its performance, the plaintiff will
sometimes be expected to make efforts to minimize damages by
securing substitute performance. ' 12' Employment cases, in contrast
with sale-of-goods cases, often demonstrate the greater tension
regarding whether the substitute is sufficiently comparable. Thus,
"the employee is not expected to minimize damages by accepting an
entirely different position with the employer or an abandonment of
rights under the original contract."' 125 The uniqueness of the position
under the contract makes it less likely that the defendant can offer a
viable substitute 26 or that one exists with another employer. Still,
the nonbreaching party must make reasonable efforts to find
substitute employment. If the breaching party can show the plaintiff
failed to do so, the court will reduce the plaintiffs damages to the
extent that the plaintiff could have avoided the harm.
market uncertainty for tomato crops established the inadequacy of legal remedies and thus
warranted the equitable remedy of specific performance, injunctive relief, and a receiver to
harvest the entire tomato crop from the specified land as promised).
122. See U.C.C. § 2-712. If a plaintiff makes the purchase, but it occurs after a commercially
reasonable time, the result is less than clear; however, some support exists for penalizing the
plaintiff for the unreasonable delay. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.6(2), at 134 n.39 (emphasizing
that Professors Summers and White maintained that "waiting too long will deprive the plaintiff of
the cover remedy and also bar or diminish any consequential damages recovery that could have
been avoided by taking reasonable action").
123. See U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 2 (noting that subsection 2 regarding consequential damages
"modifies the rule by requiring first that the buyer attempt to minimize his damages in good faith,
either by cover or otherwise").
124. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.6(2), at 134 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. f(1981)).
125. Id. at 135.
126. See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970) (ruling, as a
matter of law, that the offered substitute film, Big Country, Big Man, was not substantially similar
to an agreed upon film, but instead was found to be "inferior" employment for the plaintiff
Shirley MacLaine, who expected to perform in the film Bloomer Girl pursuant to the contract).
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Contracts case law broadly supports the notion that a plaintiff
should minimize damages by stopping the accumulation of losses
and, when appropriate, by taking reasonable affirmative steps to find
a substitute transaction. This minimization principle is known in
many circles as the duty to mitigate damages for breach of contract.
The use of the term stirs controversy because it is not a duty in the
traditional sense.'27 Rather, adoption of the term duty misleads the
audience because "the injured party incurs no liability to the party in
breach by failing to take such steps."' 2 8 Although the entrenched
terminology lacks precision, the limiting principle of mitigation or
avoidability remains intact: the nonbreaching party, who fails to take
reasonable steps, "is simply precluded from recovering damages for
loss that it could have avoided, had it taken such steps. ' 29
iii. Justifications for the Mitigation Doctrine
Like the Hadley principle, the mitigation concept also serves as
a doctrine of limitation on contract damages. As noted, Professor
Dobbs suggested three rationales for Hadley's "contemplation of the
parties" limitation: (i) moral, (ii) economic, and (iii) pragmatic.'3 °
Depending upon how one defines a moral rationale, all three
foundational principles may have relevance to the doctrine of
mitigation. Professor Dobbs's narrow construction of the moral
rationale, however, appears not to apply. Under a different moral
framework-one that includes the principle that "promises ought to
be kept"-compatibility with the mitigation doctrine is debatable.
And perhaps, such moral considerations run counter to an
avoidability limitation. The economic and pragmatic justifications
resonate more clearly. Additional driving forces may also help to
explain the mitigation doctrine.
Regarding Professor Dobbs's moral rationale-"damages as
measured by our agreement"-it does not serve as a ground for the
doctrine of mitigation. He maintains that the Hadley limitation stems
127. See Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages upon a Tenant's Abandonment, 34
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 721, 723 (2000) ("The word 'duty' is not here used in the ordinary
sense of a legal duty, since there is no corresponding 'right,' and the breach of the 'duty' does not
give rise to 'liability,' as these words are commonly understood.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128. FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, at 807.
129. Id.
130. See supra Part IV.B.i (exploring the foundations of the Hadley doctrine).
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from the agreement between the parties.13 1 Accordingly, damages
flow from the voluntary agreement. This notion is most clear if the
contract actually contains a liquidated damages clause. If the
contract contains a liquidated damages clause, then the parties have
explicitly made clear the damages that should flow in the event of
breach. Liquidated damages are enforceable, however, only if
damages were "difficult to ascertain" and the liquidated damages
provision represents a "reasonable estimation" of the damages (at the
time of contract or the time of breach) rather than a penalty.'33
Without liquidated damages, the preferred contract remedy is
expectancy damages and, in the alternative, reliance damages. Both
of these fit within Dobbs's construct in that they hinge upon the
agreement made. Expectancy damages yield the benefit of the
bargain by hypothetically placing the plaintiff where she expected to
be had the defendant performed as promised and then requiring the
defendant to pay the corresponding monetary amount.'34 In the
simplest form of expectancy damages, the breaching party pays the
promised contract amount as the ordinary or natural consequence of
breach. 35  Upon entering a contract, the parties also anticipate that
131. See DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.4(4), at 82.
132. See, e.g., ALFRED WILLIAM BAYS, GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACTS: WITH PRELIMINARY
CHAPTERS ON GENERAL SURVEY AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 189 (2d ed. 1920) ("If the
damages will be difficult to ascertain and the amount is reasonable, a provision in a contract
stated to be by way of liquidated damages, will be so construed. If the damages are difficult to
ascertain and the sum is stated to be payable as damages, and is not unreasonable in amount, it
will be so enforced.").
133. See, e.g., Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755 (6th Cir. 1999) ("In
Tennessee, a provision will be considered one for liquidated damages, rather than a penalty, if it
is reasonable in relation to the anticipated damages for breach, measured prospectively at the time
the contract was entered into, and not grossly disproportionate to the actual damages."); Kellam v.
Hampton, 124 S.W. 970, 970 (Tex. App. 1910) ("Where damages are not capable of being
ascertained by any satisfactory rule and the language of the contract admits of the construction,
the sum reserved is 'liquidated damages,' but where the loss may be easily determined by proof
of market values, the sum reserved is a 'penalty' subject to the intention of the parties as
evidenced by the contract.").
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 ("[T]he injured party has a right to
damages based on his expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in the value to him of the
other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus (b) any other loss, including
incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less (c) any cost or other loss that he has
avoided by not having to perform.").
135. Id. The primary aim of expectancy relief is to award money damages to compensate the
plaintiff for the position she would have occupied upon the performance of the promise, i.e., for
her expectation interest otherwise known as the benefit of the bargain. Id. "Damages for breach
of contract embrace both losses incurred and gains prevented; contract damages seek to
approximate the agreed upon performance." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 46, at 86 (2003).
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performance may require out-of-pocket costs. These costs may
amount to a reliance form of damages if the claim for expectancy
damages fails.
If a plaintiff instead seeks consequential damages, such as lost
profits, as her expectancy measure instead of reliance damages, she
may well fail under the Hadley limitation. To recover lost profits
under Hadley, the parties must have contemplated them at the time of
contracting.'36 If the lost profits were not reasonably foreseeable at
the time of the agreement, they are not recoverable under the Hadley
principle.'37 This consequence flows at least in part, as Dobbs
suggests, from the agreement of the parties; it asks, what did they
contemplate at the time of contracting? Broadly, the moral rationale,
under Dobbs's framing, holds that damages should be measured by
Generally, in a breach-of-contract action, a plaintiff may recover the amount of
damages necessary to place him in the same position he would have occupied had the
breach not occurred. In other words, the general rule of damages in a breach-of-
contract action is that the award should place the injured party in the same or as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, less proper
deductions. However, the injured party should not be put in a better position than had
the contract been performed or be provided with a windfall recovery.
Id. at 86-87. Would a disgorgement remedy-measured by the defendant's wrongful gain of
profits-pose a windfall to the plaintiff? Section 39 states that disgorgement relief will not flow
to the extent that the amount constitutes a windfall to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 39(4) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). Ostensibly, a
plaintiff would prefer disgorgement over expectancy damages if the defendant's profit is more
than the benefit of the bargain, but the disgorgement would then represent a windfall. Section
39's inadequacy requirement means there is no viable expectancy damage; thus, in practice,
whether the profit gained constitutes a windfall will be a matter of interpretation.
136. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147-48 (Exch.) ("Where two parties
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to
receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be
considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach
of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if
the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made where communicated by
the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the
breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of
injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances
so known and communicated.").
137. Id. ("[I]f these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the
contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of
injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special
circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally
from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary
circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a
reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the
defendants.")
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the agreement. 138  The Hadley principle takes Dobbs's moral
rationale deeper by placing beyond the pale any consequential
damages that were not in the contemplation of the parties at the time
of contracting. 139  Accordingly, the contract and the parties'
contemplation at the time of contracting support the notion that the
breacher should be responsible to pay damages in the amount
reasonably foreseen by the parties.
Does the mitigation doctrine also flow from the agreement of the
parties rather than from above? Again, the core mitigation or
avoidance principle is that a plaintiff must take reasonable steps to
avoid the consequences of the defendant's breach. Assuming the
contract does not contain a provision calling for such steps, 4 ' does
this limit come from the contract? Without explicit contract
language, it is hard to conceive that these affirmative requirements
flow from the contract. Under a negative form of avoidance, the
plaintiff should cease activity to stop the accumulation of damage.
This negative limit does not appear to spring from the contract unless
it is implicit in the parties' understanding. But, if the negative form
stems from common sense, it arguably also comes from above.
Accordingly, Professor Dobbs's narrow conception of the moral
rationale does not appear to cover the doctrine of mitigation in any of
its forms.
Unbounded by Professor Dobbs's construction, the term
morality garners broader meaning. Many will disagree about the
precise contours. But, if we assume a broader conception of morality
that infuses an ought from above or a conscience from within, 4' the
doctrine of mitigation likely runs counter to such a broader morality.
Under one possible moral frame, Professor Robin West maintains
that one is morally obligated to perform contractual promises rather
than weigh the option to pay damages or perform.'42 Professor West
thus rejects the Holmesian-choice model, which permits weighing
138. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.4(5), at 85.
139. Hadley, supranote 136.
140. Of course, the parties are free to agree to an avoidance of damages principle, as long as it
does not violate public policy.
141. Dobbs's notion may have intended an ought from the contract itself. In other words, the
act of agreeing creates an obligation by which one ought to abide. Whether one squares that
obligation by paying for the consequences rather than actually rendering the performance
promised is an issue for another day. See generally DOBBS, supra note 77.
142. Robin West, Three Positivisms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 791, 811 (1998).
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the option to pay damages or perform.'43 Seana Shiffrin, Professor of
Philosophy and Law, explores this "divergence" between a promise
and a legally enforceable contract: "If contract law ran parallel to
morality, then contract law would-as the norms of promises do-
require that promisors keep their promises as opposed merely to
paying off their promisees. '
Furthermore, Professor Shiffrin contends that "[t]he mitigation
doctrine provides another example of divergence."'45  She
acknowledges, however, that "morality does not look
sympathetically upon promisees who stay idle while easily avoidable
damages accumulate."'46  An anti-sentiment for idleness does not
ground a legal doctrine that imposes potentially affirmative duties on
the nonbreaching party instead of the breacher.'47 In fact, Professor
Shiffrin asserts that "promissory norms" run in the opposite direction
because they "would ordinarily place the burden on the promisor,
rather than the promisee, to locate and provide" a reasonable
substitute. 148 If the promisor opts to mitigate harms, such behavior
may be supererogatory. With significant force, Professor Shiffrin
maintains:
It is morally distasteful to expect the promisee to do work
that could be done by the promisor when the occasion for
the work is the promisor's own wrongdoing. That
expectation is especially distasteful when its rationale is
that it makes the promisor's wrongdoing easier, simpler,
more convenient, or less costly.
49
Professor Shiffrin's theory is persuasive, as long as one views breach
as morally wrong. A traditional Holmesian conception of the legal
principles of contract would resist this temptation. Further,
advocates of the choice principle might argue that the doctrine of
143. Id.
144. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708, 722 (2007).
145. Id. at 724.
146. Id.
147. See id. (noting that morality's anti-sympathy for idleness in the face of "easily
avoidable" harms "is a far cry fiom what contract expects of the promisee and what it fails to
demand of the breaching promisor").
148. Id. at 725.
149. Id.
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mitigation does not require any moral rationale if other sufficient
rationales exist (such as the economic or pragmatic rationales). 5 °
But, is there a conception of morality that is compatible with the
mitigation doctrine? The answer could be yes, at least if one
performs an ends-based analysis. If the mitigation doctrine requires
a plaintiff to take reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of
breach, what are possible morally infused bases for this conclusion?
Perhaps, the Protestant work ethic, 5' or other comparable moral
bases for self-help,'52 would support a requirement that an employee
seek substitute employment in the event of breach, rather than being
"lazy."' 53  Or perhaps moral support for the doctrine of mitigation
flows from the notion that it is "the virtuous thing to do-namely, to
be gracious and forgiving in the face of another's wrong."'54
Professor Shiffrin suggests that certain circumstances might exist
where "it can be morally wrong for the promisee to refuse to
mitigate, especially when the costs of refusal are very steep and
disproportionate to the seriousness of what is promised."'55  At
minimum, one may have an ethical obligation to weigh the present
circumstances and act conscientiously with an eye towards all
consequences.
The clearest rationale supporting mitigation stems from
economic considerations. According to Professor Farnsworth, "[t]he
economic justification of such a rule is plain for it encourages the
injured party to act so as to minimize the wasteful results of
breach."'56 The mitigation doctrine is a nod to resource constraints,
150. Of course, the economic and pragmatic rationales are not necessarily mutually exclusive
with morality.
151. See generally MAX WEBER, TALCOTT PARSONS & MICHAEL D. COE, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, (TALCOT PARSONS TRANS.) (2003).
152. See generally RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR
SELF-RELIANCE COMPENSATION (Am. Book Co. 1893).
153. See Mark S. Kende, Deconstructing Constructive Discharge: The Misapplication of
Constructive Discharge Standards in Employment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 39, 75 (1995) ("[T]he purpose of the mitigation rule is to encourage employees to continue
working ... [and] eliminate the possibility that an employee can simply depart without reason
and remain lazily at home with hopes of profiting.").
154. Shiffrin, supra note 144 at 726.
155. Id. at 725 (noting also that the moral wrongfulness of a promisee's refusal to mitigate
"may depend on a number of factors to which the law is insensitive, including the closeness of the
relationship, the history of the relationship, the reason for breach, the reason the promisor wants
to shift the burden, and how cumbersome mitigation activities would be").
156. FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 12.12, at 806.
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but it asks something of the nonbreacher rather than the breacher. In
fact, the doctrine of mitigation, in Professor Farnsworth's estimation,
"allows the obligor to call upon the obligee's efforts to reduce the
cost of satisfying the obligor's duty to perform."' 57  As Professor
Shiffrin emphasized, American contract law does not morally
obligate the promisor to perform.'58 Rather, it requires only that the
promisor pay damages for breach unless circumstances warrant
specific performance. Accordingly, the breacher ordinarily must
satisfy the legal duty by paying expectancy damages for the ordinary
consequences of breach and the other consequences within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. 159 Yet, the
breacher may use the mitigation doctrine to reduce those damages.
Why would the law favor the breacher versus the nonbreacher? On
economic grounds, the law of contracts encourages the avoidance of
waste. Thus, a party who learns of breach should stop further
activity that would continue the accumulation of damages. Perhaps
this is simply common sense, but it is also founded in economic
rationality. Further, economic theory also supports an affirmative
mitigation principle that asks the nonbreacher to take reasonable
steps to secure a suitable substitute. The nonbreacher's successful
mitigation ideally results in a better allocation of resources and
services for broader economic welfare.
Under Professor Dobbs's pragmatic conception, the mitigation
doctrine also finds support. Perhaps any identifiable rule would find
pragmatic support. The clearer the rule, the more it services Dobbs's
pragmatism because it assists courts in establishing a cutoff for
liability. For instance, jurisdictions adopting tort law's economic
loss rule 6' are more pragmatic than jurisdictions utilizing the duty
157. Id. at 807.
158. Shiffrin, supra note 144, at 725.
159. Alternatively, the breacher pays reliance damages to compensate the nonbreaching party
for his out-of-pocket expenses made in reliance on the contract. Compare Hawkins v. McGee,
146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929) (utilizing an expectancy measure because the goal of contract law is
"to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the defendant kept his
contract") (citing 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338), with Sullivan v.
O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Mass. 1973) (endorsing a reliance measure as the best
alternative in cases such as a "breach of the patient-physician agreements . . . [where] a recovery
limited to restitution seems plainly too meager . but "[o]n the other hand, an expectancy
recovery may well be excessive")).
160. See, e.g., Local Joint Exec. Bd., Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 v. Stem, 651
P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982) (per curiam) ("The well established common law rule is that absent
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and proximate cause standards of tort doctrine. 6' More broadly, this
observation may be a byproduct from the nature of rules versus
standards. 6 2 Do the concepts of mitigation and avoidance resemble a
bright-line rule? At times, they may. When mitigation efforts result
in the plaintiff finding a replacement, the court will reduce the
damages by the savings.
Yet, like most doctrines, mitigation principles have room for
interpretation. For example, vigorous debate may ensue regarding
"reasonableness" of the plaintiff's failure to stop, act, or take proper
steps. Such interpretation may make line-drawing more difficult.
But, Professor Dobbs's concern with pragmatism presumes that we
need and want a cutoff for liability. From a legal perspective, I agree
that we do not want the consequences of breach to extend to infinity,
privity of contract or an injury to person or property, a plaintiff may not recover in negligence for
economic loss.").
161. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65 (Cal. 1979) (advocating that a special
duty of care criteria will "place a limit on recovery by focusing judicial attention on the
foreseeability of the injury and the nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
injury" and that "[t]hese factors and ordinary principles of tort law such as proximate cause are
fully adequate to limit recovery without the drastic consequence of an absolute rule which bars
recovery in all such cases").
162. Professor Kathleen Sullivan concisely summarizes the essence of the rules versus
standards debate:
Law translates background social policies or political principles such as truth, fairness,
efficiency, autonomy, and democracy into a grid of legal directives that
decisionmakers in turn apply to particular cases and facts. In a non-legal society, one
might apply these background policies or principles directly to a fact situation. But, in
a society with laws, using the intermediary of legal directives is thought to make
decisionmakers' lives easier, improve the quality of their decisions, or constrain their
naked exercises of choice.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court-1991 Term Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992). "A rule may be understood as simply the
crystalline precipitate of prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way .... On
this view, a rule is a standard that has reached epistemological maturity." Id. at 62 (citing
generally for the rules and standards debate: MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 n.35 (1991);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687-1713 (1976); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781,
783-90 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-
93 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379-430 (1985)); see also
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES & COMMENT 86 (8th ed. 2003) (exploring rules
versus standards and Judge Posner's take: (i) rules focus on a few facts as conclusive of legal
liability, while standards allow "'consideration of all' and (ii) rules are "'definite, ..... inflexible,
even arbitrary, and thus overinclusive"' and/or "'underinclusive,"' while standards are "flexible,
but vague and open-ended") (quoting MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-57
(7th Cir. 2000)).
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whether tort or contract. In fact, the interests of complete justice tilt
otherwise.'63 The legal system contains principles that might support
a world without "limitations" on liability or damages."6 Those
strains include the maxim, "[flor every wrong, there is a remedy,"
along with notions of corrective justice.'65 Yet, the law retains its
limits. Why then would the law diverge from complete justice?
Perhaps the following pragmatic explanation suffices:
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every
wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of
this world. Every injury has ramifying consequences like
the ripplings of the waters without end. The problem for
the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree.66
Yet, some principle or policy must drive the choice as to when
liability should cease. Pragmatism does not provide that driving
value for deciding when to cut off liability or remedies.
Can the law be sensitive to values that stem from justice and/or
economic considerations while still providing a bright-line rule?'67
In response to this potential objection, Professor Shiffrin notes that
clear, yet more sensitive, rules exist "in other equally complex
contexts."'68 More pointedly, she wonders, "why, if a blunt rule is
necessary, it should be fashioned to favor systematically the
breaching promisor and not the promisee. '  Regardless of the
foundation for a doctrine of mitigation-moral, economic,
pragmatic, or otherwise-this final point reiterates that the doctrine
both creates incentives and generates consequences that favor the
breacher over the nonbreacher.
Each doctrine, limitation, and remedy creates--or reinforces-
line-drawing. In so doing, each has an opportunity to value an
163. See Shiffrin, supra note 144, at 724 ("If one is bound to perform but without excuse
voluntarily elects to breach one's duty, a case could be made that the promisor should be liable
for all consequential damages.").
164. See, e.g., id. at 724.
165. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (Deering 2008).
166. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969); see also RENDLEMAN, supra note
14, at 541.
167. See Shiffrin, supra note 144, at 725 (considering the potential argument that sensitivity
factors are incompatible with "the need to formulate a clear rule").
168. Id.
169. Id. at 725-26.
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underlying policy. The pendency of this new rule of restitutionary
disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract provides a moment
to revisit policies supporting related doctrines, such as mitigation.
Disgorgement also includes value choices, but those may be in
tension with the rationales for mitigation. Notably, restitutionary
disgorgement when available as a remedy for breach of contract
seeks to re-shift the balance that mitigation honors; disgorgement
favors the nonbreacher by allowing her to recover more than her loss.
V. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN RESTITUTIONARY
DISGORGEMENT AND CONTRACT MITIGATION
The pending disgorgement section in its narrowest conception
will have limited application. Restitutionary disgorgement will
effectively be available only when the plaintiff can establish a right
to specific performance. Even under this narrow conception,
disgorgement possibly conflicts with contract law's doctrine of
mitigation."'
The following diagram facilitates the discussion of this possible
tension between mitigation, Axis A, and restitutionary disgorgement,
Axis B. The root of the tension between the two axes exists
primarily on the theoretical plane, but room for reconciliation exists
on the practical plane. The following diagram depicts this construct.
170. Not surprisingly, specific performance also poses friction with the doctrine of mitigation.
See Lionel Smith, Understanding Specific Performance, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT 221 (E. McKendrick & N. Cohen eds., 2005) ("It is notorious that
specific performance is, in some cases, overcompensatory, because it seems to override the
plaintiff's duty to mitigate her loss during the period between breach and judicial order.").
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Practical
Plane
- Axis B
- -Restitutionary
....Disgorgement
Theoretical
Plane
Axis A
Mitigation
The underlying principles of disgorgement generally conflict with
the traditional theoretical underpinnings of American contract law.
Contract's doctrine of mitigation is no exception to this underlying
friction.
A. Theoretical Plane-Tensions between Disgorgement
and Mitigation Rationales
As explored in related articles,171 American contract law's
preferred remedy is expectancy.' This remedy is compensatory,'73
171. See Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12; Roberts, Commonwealth
Disgorgement, supra note 12.
172. DAWSON ET AL., supra note 162, at 3 (characterizing the expectancy measure as
"contract law's normal rule of recovery").
173. Id. (explaining that expectancy damages provide "the award of a sum of money intended
to give the injured party 'compensation"'). The compensatory nature can be complex given its
"'hypothetical"' exploration into a position the plaintiff would have occupied "'if history had
been different."' Id. (quoting 5 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964)).
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and American contract law prohibits punitive damages. 74 In fact,
contract law generally does not judge the breaching party's motives.
Similarly, disgorgement's underlying principles contrast markedly
with these basic tenets of contract law.
Disgorgement, familiar in the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment, now seeks a more visible role as a remedy for a limited
set of contractual breaches. As Professor Dawson feared, unjust
enrichment injects slippery notions of justice and fairness.
Disgorgement, rooted in unjust enrichment, seeks to disgorge the
profits from a defendant's conscious wrongdoing. Then, add the
layer of the Restatement's cabining of disgorgement to opportunistic
breaches of contract. Ostensibly, the term opportunistic labels a set
of contractual breaches that involve conscious wrongdoing of the
sort warranting disgorgement.'75  Professor Kull assures that
opportunistic is defined by the wording of the pending Restatement
provision. Most notably, the breach must be deliberate and
profitable as defined in the Restatement.'76
Yet the term opportunistic implies moral blameworthiness.
Even putting aside its connotations, its common definition is:
"exploiting immediate opportunities, especially in an unplanned or
selfish way."'7  Further, the Restatement's proposed remedy of
disgorgement for such breaches possesses punitive elements, as I
explore extensively in another article. 7 ' One may conclude,
however, that enabling restitutionary disgorgement for opportunistic
breaches of contract does not have punitive aspects. Regardless, the
disgorgement remedy admittedly and undeniably focuses on the
defendant's gain rather than the plaintiffs loss. This feature alone is
a foundational shift from traditional contract doctrine.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979); see also Shiffrin, supra note
144, at 710 ("Contract law's stance on the wrongfulness of promissory breach is equivocal at
best, manifested most clearly by its general prohibition of punitive damages."). But cf Dodge,
supra note 26 (advocating that economic efficiency supports punitive damages for willful breach
of contract).
175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 39 cmt. g, at
22 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (offering that the instant disgorgement remedy will "principally"
apply to "instances of conscious wrongdoing" rather than "any default that results from the
defendant's inadvertence, negligence, or unsuccessful attempt").
176. Id. § 39(2).
177. CONCISE OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1003 (1 1th ed. 2004).
178. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12.
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The theoretical rationales for mitigation, as explored above,'79
are also in discord with the justifications for a restitutionary
disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breach of contract. Whether
viewed through moral, economic, or pragmatic lenses, the primary
thrust behind the mitigation principle is don't be lazy-instead avoid
unnecessary consequences. It asks the nonbreaching party to
participate and avoid consequences by stopping or by acting.
Mitigation's focus on the nonbreacher runs counter to disgorgement
principles. Disgorgement focuses on the breacher and holds the
breacher accountable for her conscious wrongdoing. At maximum,
this accountability will subject the breacher to blame and
punishment.
The incentive to avoid consequences may have multiple
foundations and multiple beneficiaries. For example, if the
nonbreacher effectively mitigates, it benefits the breacher (by
reducing damages), may benefit society (by allocating resources
more efficiently), and may also benefit the nonbreacher (by
providing the benefit of the bargain more quickly than litigation).
This arguable benefit to the nonbreacher does not mean that the
plaintiff preferred breach to performance. But where a party has
breached, the doctrine of mitigation may benefit the plaintiff who
would rather not wait for damages at the end of litigation. The
plaintiff, however, might think, "I am innocent, and I will wait for
the defendant to pay my full damages." If the law prefers that a
plaintiff resist the idleness temptation-for whatever reason-then it
should continue to support the doctrine of mitigation. Given the
tension between the theoretical underpinnings of disgorgement and
mitigation, is it possible to live in a legal world with both?
B. Practical Plane-Possible Reconciliation for
Disgorgement and Mitigation
With the theoretical underpinnings in mind, how might
disgorgement and mitigation work together in practice? The theory
no doubt influences the contours of the doctrines and thus their
practical applications. Even if disgorgement's frame is the
defendant's gain rather than the plaintiffs loss, the law may still
have an interest in keeping the plaintiffs losses down. Three
179. See supra Part IV.B.iii.
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conceptualizations capture the practical interplay between
restitutionary disgorgement and mitigation. These categories are:
(i) Mitigation Inapplicable; (ii) Mitigation Reduction; and
(iii) Mitigation Prerequisite.
i. Mitigation Inapplicable
Prior to the Restatement's proposed restitutionary disgorgement
remedy, Professor Dobbs addressed the interplay between the
concept of damage minimization via substitute transactions and a
plaintiffs right to specific performance.18 ° Dobbs's remedies treatise
declares:
If the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance at his
option, that entitlement is necessarily inconsistent with any
expectation that the plaintiff will minimize by securing
substitute performance; the right to demand performance
from A must mean that there is no obligation to accept
performance from B instead.''
In other words, if a plaintiff is able to secure a substitute, specific
performance is unnecessary and impermissible because the ability to
secure a reasonable substitute belies an argument of uniqueness.
Accordingly, section 39 disgorgement would also be unavailable.
As crafted, the Restatement's disgorgement remedy is available
only if the plaintiff lacks an adequate damage remedy.182 Thus,
"where substitutes for the promised subject matter are attainable and
expectation damages would be adequate, a defendant's profits or
savings should not be the basis of recovery. '  This phrasing raises
the irreparable injury test utilized for equitable efforts to obtain
specific performance.'84 Irreparable injury asks whether the plaintiff
has been irreparably harmed such that legal remedies are inadequate.
If the promised performance is unique, then ostensibly the legal
180. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.6(2), at 137.
181. Id.
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(2)(c)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
183. Peter Benson, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract and Corrective Justice: An Analysis
in Outline, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 312 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 2004).
184. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 37 (1991)
(examining the rule and its decline) (cited by Professor Kull in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 reporter's note c, at 30 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2005)).
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remedy of money (e.g., expectancy) damages "will not do" because a
market substitute is unattainable, and thus an extraordinary equitable
remedy, such as specific performance, should be available. If
disgorgement, as proposed in the Restatement, runs parallel to
specific performance, the remedy would require uniqueness of the
promised performance. If the performance is unique, by definition,
affirmative mitigation is impossible.
A tricky question arises if the plaintiff does not secure a
substitute, and the defendant argues that the plaintiff should have
taken reasonable steps to find one. If the defendant can show that a
suitable substitute hypothetically existed, then the promised
performance is not unique, fails to qualify for specific performance,
and similarly fails to trigger a path to section 39 disgorgement. This
logic supports Professor Dobbs's assessment regarding the
inapplicability of the mitigation doctrine to specific performance and
extends to disgorgement.'85 But could there be any similarities
between the doctrine of mitigation and disgorgement if we view
mitigation more broadly?
ii. Mitigation Reduction
Is it possible to grant to the plaintiff the defendant's gain minus
the avoidable consequences the plaintiff could have saved? This
"mitigation reduction" theory would represent the marginal
difference between unavoidable loss to the plaintiff and the
defendant's gain-the profits wrongfully obtained as a result of the
breach. It would honor the notion that a plaintiff cannot "run up the
score" by continuing to accumulate damage. Instead, the plaintiff
would be incentivized to mitigate or else face a possible reduction of
the disgorgement amount. Accordingly, if a plaintiff seeks to
disgorge the profits that the defendant garnered as a result of a
breach of contract, the court might disgorge such profits but deduct
an amount that the plaintiff should have avoided by stopping
activities under the contract. This notion is not symmetrical. A
defendant's gain is not measured by a plaintiff's loss. So, deducting
from the defendant's profit the amounts that the plaintiff should have
saved may not make sense. Why not let the plaintiff be free to
accumulate losses after learning of breach because the defendant will
185. DOBBS, supra note 77, § 12.6(2) at 137.
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not be responsible for paying for them anyway? Then, the plaintiff
can disgorge the causally linked profits and apply them towards the
plaintiffs loss if so desired.
Does disgorgement as limited in section 39 permit this
reduction? Again, the Restatement's proposal appears to contain an
irreparable injury standard, as if the plaintiff were seeking specific
performance.'86 As discussed in Part V.B.i, affirmative mitigation
appears to be incongruous with section 39 disgorgement. But what
of negative mitigation? When notified of anticipatory repudiation,
should a plaintiff "put down the shovel" to avoid unnecessary
consequences? If the plaintiff stops, the plaintiff may be able to sue
for disgorgement if the plaintiff satisfies the requirements of section
39. As proposed, section 39 does not appear to mandate negative
mitigation. Yet, if the plaintiff continues with the performance under
the contract-for whatever reason-he can still seek the
disgorgement remedy. The remedy would be directly linked to the
defendant's gain. If a plaintiff should have taken reasonable steps to
stop unnecessary consequences, should a remedy disgorging a
defendant's profits deduct those avoidable consequences? The lack
of a symbiotic connection may render this avenue less preferred than
having mitigation serve as a prerequisite to a disgorgement remedy.
iii. Mitigation Prerequisite
Assuming the law wanted to value self-help and reallocation,
perhaps efforts to mitigate could be a prerequisite for seeking the
disgorgement remedy. Implicitly, the showing of uniqueness may
approach this direction already. Certain areas, such as contracts for
the sale of land, arrive with sufficient historical support for
establishing uniqueness that a plaintiff need not have taken any steps
to prove uniqueness. Note that if a plaintiff is seeking specific
performance, it is ordinarily the plaintiffs burden to pass the
irreparable injury hurdle. The mitigation doctrine traditionally
places the burden on the defendant. So, in many cases where
uniqueness is a matter of interpretation should the plaintiff be
required to attempt to take reasonable steps to avoid the
consequence? If so, who should carry this burden of proof? If the
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(2)(c)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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law and the Restatement seek to make disgorgement truly rare, then
the plaintiff must carry this additional burden to justify what may be
an extraordinary remedy.
A mitigation prerequisite would also honor the values of self-
help and efficient allocation of resources. Further, it would leave the
possibility that a defendant may be able to retain profits from its
replacement deal. Of course, if the profits are the result of conscious
wrongdoing, perhaps disgorgement advocates would be unsatisfied
with this result. If so, then the Restatement should not adopt
mitigation as a prerequisite. Instead, the Restatement should lower
the proposed hurdles for the disgorgement remedy, namely, the
inadequacy requirement. This bolder move, however, would require
greater acknowledgement of the desire to inject moral
blameworthiness and disincentivize opportunistic breaches of
contract. A more readily applicable disgorgement remedy, however,
will raise more judicial and scholarly eyebrows because it contrasts
with the governing narrative of contract law: one may choose to
breach and pay the consequences, expectancy damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
The topic of unjust enrichment restitution is ripe for further
utilization in American law. The pending Restatement, anticipated
for publication in 2010, will go far in revitalizing this subject and
edifying constituents about its nuanced contours. One of the boldest,
and most exciting, components of the pending Restatement is
section 39's disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breaches of
contract. Like moths to a flame, plaintiffs' lawyers, students, and
academics will be instantly attracted to this essentially new rule.
Many facets of unjust enrichment and restitution law overlap with
other substantive areas of law. Therefore, concerns about the
anticipated impact of any new sections on the substantive doctrines
of contract, tort, and property law require careful consideration.
Restitutionary disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract
poses significant tensions with the underlying foundation of contract
law, or at least with the official story of contract law. It claims
narrow application, but comes with broad theoretical justifications
that may conflict with the influential choice principle of contract law.
The choice principle balances freedom with responsibility without
emphasizing blameworthiness. Disgorgement, rooted in unjust
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enrichment, provides an inroad into examining the conscious
wrongdoing of the breacher. If applied, it de-opportunizes breach.
The defendant may feel judged, and perhaps even punished, for
obtaining a bigger, better deal. At minimum, disgorgement
refocuses the inquiry on the breacher's behavior and the breacher's
gain. Both are a shift from the focus of contract law's traditional
gaze.
As examined in the instant Article, contract law's doctrine of
mitigation demonstrates the underlying tensions with a restitutionary
disgorgement remedy. On the theoretical plane, potentially deep
conflicts regarding the supporting rationale for disgorgement and
mitigation exist. Yet, on the practical plane, three potential avenues
exist regarding the interface between the disgorgement remedy and
the mitigation doctrine: (i) Mitigation Inapplicable, (ii)Mitigation
Reduction, and (iii) Mitigation Prerequisite. Ultimately, this Article
shows the possibilities for the law to find an avenue to permit the
bold disgorgement remedy in the proper contractual breach
circumstances and to foster an environment in which actors operate
conscientiously to mitigate avoidable consequences.
